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This meeting provided a forum for 132 representatives from the Department of Health 
and Human Services (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), and National Institutes of Health (NIH)), Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), Department of Defense (DoD),  Department of Energy (DoE), US Postal 
Service, State Health Departments, universities and other organizations to identify,  prioritize, 
and coordinate near-term Bacillus anthracis bioterrorism research for public health response.   
 
During the recent anthrax bioterrorism investigation CDC and its partners identified a 
number of areas where additional research may be useful in improving public health response.  
The disciplines and specific expertise required to approach many of these areas are varied and 
exist within multiple federal government entities and elsewhere.   To address those research 
questions that are most critical to improving public health response to B. anthracis-related 
bioterrorism, CDC convened this meeting to obtain input on critical research priorities and 
coordinate with federal partners and other stakeholders in planning and conduct of applied 
research that needs to be initiated within the next 12 months. 
 
The workshop format consisted of two plenary sessions in which experts provided 
summaries of the existing science in key topic areas.  Background talks were given on the 
“Evaluation of B. anthracis containing powders or substances” by Mathew Shaw, Battelle 
Memorial Institute; “Epidemiologic Investigation” by Philip Brachman, Emory University, 
School of Public Health; “Environmental Assessment” by Edwin Kilbourne, Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Drug Research; “Surveillance” by Ruth Berkelman, Emory University; 
“Introduction to issues in Diagnosis, Treatment, and Prevention of Anthrax” by Art Friedlander, 
US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), DoD; “Diagnosis” 
by Susan Alpert, C.R. Bard, Inc.;  “Treatment” by Dennis Stevens, Veterans Affairs Medical 
Center, University of Washington; “Post-exposure prophylaxis” by Diane Murphy, Food and 
Drug Administration; and “Remediation” by Dorothy Cantor, Environmental Protection Agency.    
 
Following the first plenary session, participants were divided into eight pre-assigned 
working groups.  The eight working groups included: 1) Evaluation of B. anthracis containing 
powders or substances, 2) Epidemiological investigation, 3) Environmental assessment, 4) 
Surveillance, 5) Diagnosis, 6) Treatment, 7) Post-exposure prophylaxis, and 8) Remediation.  
Each of the 8 working groups had pre-assigned co-leaders, one from outside of CDC and one 
from CDC.   Each of the CDC co-leads were senior scientists who had been heavily involved in 
the anthrax bioterrorism investigation and response.   Lists of specific questions were given to 
each of the working groups to help stimulate discussion and provide direction based on 
observations during the anthrax bioterrorism investigation.  During the second plenary session 
each of the groups presented interim results of discussion for input from the larger group of 
meeting participants.  In the second working group session, groups were asked to prepare a 
written report of their group’s top three research priorities.  The following is a summary of those 
research priorities by working group and title of research project: 
 
Evaluation of  B. anthracis containing powders or substances 
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1) Development of an in vitro model for the study of cutaneous anthrax using human 
cell culture 
2) Rapid analysis of anthrax-containing powder: particle size distribution and matrix 
characteristics 
3) Measure of particle reaerosolization using different anthrax powder preparations. 
 
Epidemiologic Investigation 
1) Analysis of  individual host risk factors (for anthrax) 
2) Exposure reconstruction and risk characterization  
3) Review existing and unexamined/previously unpublished (potentially classified) 
animal data related to dose response. 
 
Environmental Assessment 
1) Validation and standardization of sampling and sample analysis techniques 
2) Evaluation of risk of disease in contaminated environments  
3) Determination of risk of reaerosolization  
 
Surveillance 
 1) Veterinary surveillance, and integration with human health information 
2) The use of other, alternative sources of data in the surveillance for bioterrorist-related 
events 
3)  Design and validation of surveillance systems to detect complex contamination or 
release scenarios  
 
Diagnosis 
1) Identifying the earliest detectable event in the continuum from exposure to anthrax to 
disease (using animal models) 
2) Rapid diagnosis of anthrax  
3) Developing a library of subtypes 
 
Treatment 
1) Investigation of the role of immune and anti-toxin therapies – a framework 
2) Expanded investigation of antibiotic therapies in animal models 
3) Developing other animal models 
 
Post-exposure Prophylaxis 
1) Long term use of antimicrobials for PEP: Monitoring of adherence, barriers to 
adherence, and adverse events  
2) Pediatric safety and immunogenicity study  
3) Animal challenge study to optimize post-exposure prophylaxis in humans 
 
Group 8: Remediation  
  
1)  Evaluation of Existing and Alternative Remediation Agents  
 5
2) Risk-Based Decision Logic for Sampling and Remediation   




Working Group 1: Evaluation of B. anthracis Containing Powder or Other Substance 
 




1) A major goal should be to analyze the feasibility of real-time rapid powder analysis to 
play a role in public health decision-making 
2) Particle sizing is valuable, but SEM alone cannot determine if it is anthrax. Also need to 
analyze the safety of doing rapid SEM with particles. 
3) Relationship between level of infection and particle size, number of spores, number of 
particles 
4) Aerosol characterization capabilities: SEM can be decontaminated without damaging 
instruments. Aerosizer can be done safely. 
5) Irradiation and effect on particle & aerosol characteristics: irradiation destroys the 
electrostatic charges but the morphology remains the same 
6) Use simulant or non-toxin forming BA and disperse into animal model 
7) Particle size: single spore particles had ¼ LD of cluster particles, suggesting much more 
virulent 
8) These groups have a lot of overlap—need combined collaboration 
 
 
Research Priority 1 
 
Title: Development of an in vitro model for the study of cutaneous anthrax using human cell 
culture 
 
Why the research is needed: No animal models for cutaneous anthrax exist or can be developed 
 
Research description and methods: 
Identify the appropriate cell culture system through: 
a) Identification and review of published/unpublished literature, classified/unclassified 
studies that have been done on this topic. 
b) Identification of an appropriate cell culture model. For example, Fred Quinn’s cell culture 
technique vs. use of transgenic mice with human ear, etc. 
c) Once model has been identified, expose or inoculate the system to various spore 
preparations and matrices as described in Project 2. 
 




Start date:  ASAP 
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Action steps with assigned responsibility: Request for proposals (RFP) 
 
 
Research Priority 2 
 
Title: Rapid analysis of anthrax-containing powder: particle size distribution and matrix 
characteristics 
   
Why the research is needed:  The accuracy of rapid tests to determine particle size and 
composition of the powder, which determine a potential hazard, are unclear. 
 
Research description: Assess and evaluate current technology specifically applied to rapid 
analysis of powder (e.g., TFMS-time flight mass spectrometry, aerosizer, FTIR, light 
microscopy, SEM, SEM-EDX [x-ray analysis], APS). 
 
Methods:  
1. Standardize several spore preparations using B anthracis and simulants (B thurigensis, 
BG) (which will also address the simulant issues) by several production methods (e.g., 
acetone drying, washing, lyophilization, weapons grade methods) coupled with matrices 
2. Use a gold standard for comparison or latent class 
 
Location of research: Appropriate facility and staff, BSL3 
 
Collaborating institutions: Batelle, Dugway, DoE, DoD, CDC, NIOSH 
 
Start date:  ASAP 
 
Action steps with assigned responsibility: RFP - Submission of formal proposal- to be 
determined 
 
Research Priority 3 
 
Title: Measure of particle reaerosolization using different anthrax powder preparations 
 
Why the research is needed: To determine the risk/hazard of reaerosolization of several spore 
preparations that vary in particle size and matrices.  Do the characteristics of particles correlate 
with the risk of reaeorsolization? 
 
Research description and methods:  
1. Preparation as mentioned in project 2. 
2. Testing would be compared in different environments: temperature, RH, applied forces as 
in offices and postal facilities HVAC, opening doors, walking, performing jobs 
a. Drop preparation 
b. Allow spores to settle 
c. Apply force 
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d. Measure reaerosolization: (e.g., slit samplers, aerosizer, APS) 
 
Location of research: Canada, Dugway 
 
Collaborating institutions: DRES, Dugway, DoD, CDC 
 
Start date:  ASAP 
 
Action steps with assigned responsibility: RFP 
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Working Group 2: Epidemiological Investigation  
 
Recommended Research Priorities 
 
 
Research Priority 1:   
 
Title: Analysis of individual host risk factors 
 
Why is research being done? 
 
-To evaluate host risk factors associated with inhalational anthrax.   
- To understand why exposed people did not become ill. 
 
What is the research? 
 
-Use exposed populations (in mail sorting facility, AMI) 
-collect demographic, epidemiologic, and clinical data on cases and controls, or perform cohort 
study  
-collect whole blood/sera to investigate role of cell mediated immunity 
-consider incorporating 2 outlier cases (CT, NYC inhalational) 
-interview all people (or surrogates for deceased) 
-as second phase, integrate results with exposure model 
 
Where could it be done? 
 




CDC as lead agency, with state health depts., postal unions, postal management, and AMI 
employers involved. 
 
When should it be started? 
 




-CDC will review existing data from cohorts, and develop a brief proposal (pass through CDC 
IRB) 
-CDC will arrange a conference call to gain input from affected parties 





Research Priority 2: 
 
Title: Exposure Reconstruction and risk characterization 
 





Why is research being done? 
 
-understand exposure associated with passage of powder-containing letters through mail 
-validate the model using empirical outcome data 
 
What is the research? 
 
- use nonbiologic inert simulant (e.g. fluorescent) to gather empirical data on dispersion 
- collect surface swab data, locations of cases and non cases from facility  
- integrate results with those including host factors data 
- modeling the effect of interventions  




-Hamilton or Brentwood postal facility 
 
When? 




-NIOSH*(lead) – Mark Hoover expressed interest 
-Defense Canada      
-Aberdeen               
-ATSDR 
-CHPPM   potential lead 
-NIST   potential lead 
-EPA 
- involve postal union/management at early step 
 
Action step: 






Research Priority 3 
 
Title: Review existing and unexamined/previously unpublished (potentially classified) 
animal data related to dose response 
 
Why:   
- this is the largest body of data addressing the various aspects of dose response 
- this data is only available in summary form, reviewing the original raw data will provide 
new insights 
 
What:   
- meta-analysis or pooling of original data 
- re-analysis of original data  
- additional new analyses of original data 
 
How: 
-identifying previous studies 
-finding original data 
- obtain approval to access data 
- find data 
- analyze 




-wherever the original data are located 
 
Who:   
CDC and EPA should initiate contact with military, formally and informally 
 
Action steps: 
1) CDC and EPA should approach contacts at Ft. Detrick for insight into process of recovering 
military technical documents.  Can this material be declassified?   
2) EPA, HHS/CDC/ATSDR should draft a joint letter to military (e.g. letter from Christine 
Whitman, Tommy Thompson, Jeff Koplan) requesting access to data 
 
 
Other priority areas that were considered 
 
-reaerosolization of settled spores and risk for disease among secondarily exposed individuals 
-adverse outcomes related to anthrax events (PEP, remediation) 
- postal worker surveillance 
 future illnesses/adverse health effects due to stress 
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-other scenarios/agents 
-long term, low level exposure 
-particle characteristics 
 cutaneous vs inhalational disease 
 relationship to infection 
-expected background level of B. anthracis in urban and rural environments  
-occurrence of sporadic inhalational anthrax cases 
-Sverdlovsk denominator data 
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Working Group 3: Environmental Assessment 
 
Recommended Research Priorities 
 
Research Priority 1 
 
Title: Validation and Standardization of Sampling and Sample Analysis Techniques 
 
Introduction 
Though environmental sampling for the presence of Bacillus anthracis has been used 
extensively in the current anthrax investigation, there is very little data available to validate the 
accuracy of different methods or to support the use of one method over another.  Currently these 
methods are being used to determine that a contamination event has occurred, to identify 
individuals potentially at risk of infection given exposure to this environmental contamination 
event, to determine the requirements for disinfection, to determine that disinfection has occurred, 
to ensure that the waste stream arising from contamination is not infective, and to ensure that 
after re-occupancy, no previously hidden contamination will pose a continuing health threat.  
Questions remain as to the validity of each type of surface sampling (swab, wipe, vacuum 
sample) in reflecting the true degree of spore contamination and the role of air sampling in a past 
exposure. Anecdotal experience from this outbreak suggest not all techniques are equally 
effective at measuring environmental spore contamination.  As well, little data exists as to which 
laboratory technique (culture, PCR or immunoassay) is most accurate in detecting the presence 
of spores.  The methods used to date during the current contamination events have been modified 
in real time in the field, in response to the lack of a standardized method that was suitable for the 
conditions encountered in the field.  The effort to determine risk of disease based on 
environmental contamination data is predicated on the reliability of this data to reflect the true 
presence of B. anthracis spores.  Perhaps the most pressing research need in this effort is to 
ensure that the sampling techniques and laboratory analysis methods are sufficiently 
standardized and validated to meet this standard. 
 
Objectives 
To perform direct comparisons of sampling techniques (including wet and dry swabs, 
large-area vacuum sampling and different methods of air sampling) linked to laboratory analysis 
methods (including PCR, culture and direct immunoflourescence) 
 
To evaluate the accuracy of air sampling techniques in detecting environmental 
contamination with spores under quiescent air conditions as well as with activity 
 
To determine whether sampling/laboratory analysis techniques can be standardized to the 
point where a quantitative result is meaningful and can give useful information about degree of 






A) Sampling Techniques in Known Contaminated Field Sites 
A number of the of the buildings involved in the current outbreak are felt to still be 
contaminated with B. anthracis spores.  Though not homogenous, this contamination represents 
an opportunity to perform a direct comparison of all of the techniques that are currently being 
used to detect surface contamination.  This category of experiments would utililize buildings 
known to be contaminated with B. anthracis to perform direct side-by-side analyses of different 
techniques used to both collect and analyze surface and air samples.  Currently, representatives 
of the U.S. Postal Service, U.S. Army, EPA, and a USPS contractor (IT Corporation) are 
working at the Brentwood mail handling facility to conduct clean-up operations.  However, 
much of the facility remains contaminated, specifically a long shelf (1 ft X 100 ft) very near the 
machine that processed the Daschle and Leahy letters, the tops of inspection window ports above 
the work area, and suspended supply-air ventilation ports.  Even though the DBCS machine 
which processed the letters has been cleaned by HEPA vacuum and washing with a 10% sodium 
hypochlorite solution, this machine is still reportedly contaminated (report obtained from Dr. 
David Ashford; Canadian Reaerosolization Survey).  For these reasons, we believe the 
Brentwood facility would be one suitable location for comparing sampling and analytical 
methods, but similar studies could be undertaken at the AMI building, Wallingford or Hamilton 
postal facilities, even in light of past decontamination efforts.   Specific methods of this study are 
attached at the end of this proposal. 
 
The Partners conducting this survey include NIOSH, NCID, ATSDR, CHPPM, EPA, Postal 
Service and IT Corporation.  The urgency of this study is high, as clean-up efforts and time 
lessen the degree of observable contamination. 
 
B) Sampling Techniques in an Experimentally Controlled Environment 
More definitive answers as to the relative accuracy of environmental sampling techniques 
can only be generated with a standard challenge of intentional spore contamination in a 
controlled environment.  The first step is to establish a working group within a matter of weeks 
to develop a standardized set of conditions for testing methods.  The tasks of this group include 
determination of a standardized set of simulants, including experimental matrices that simulate 
Aweaponization@ and a standardized method of spiking these matrices with organisms.  The 
bacteria used may be an avirulent strain of B. anthracis or another non-pathogenic Bacillus spp.  
An experimental aerosolization facility will be determined which includes many of the surfaces 
of interest (e.g., carpet, flooring, metal, paper). 
 
Once the testing conditions are established, sampling methods will need to be proposed, 
including not only sampling design strategy but also precise descriptions of sampling techniques, 
processing and specimen analysis.  The initial methods used will be those used in common 
practice and those that have proven useful in the current anthrax investigations.  If methods are 
to be tested that are beyond this scope, it will be imperative that the methods developer transfer 
the technology to this methods evaluation project, within the working parameters of the current 
project (time, cost and personnel). 
 
Once a battery of sampling methods has been assembled, each method will be tested 
using the standardized experimental contamination system.  Testing will include all phases of 
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methods including decontamination procedures, and cross contamination control protocols.  It is 
conceivable that this round of methods testing will need to be repeated both for optimization of 
techniques and for statistical validity. 
 
Potential research partners are the CDC/ATSDR, NIOSH-Cincinnati, USArmy 
(Edgewood), USArmy CHPPM, Dugway Proving Grounds, University Cincinnati, University of 
Colorado-Boulder, UNLV (DoD contractor), EPA, OSHA, and private labs (Battelle, Sandia).  
 
(The following are the specific methods for the contaminated sites study) 
 
1. Conduct a comparison of the wipe swab, and vacuum sampling techniques.  The 
locations to be sampled include the 1 ft X 100 ft shelf, the ventilation ducts directly 
above processing machine #17, the inspection window ports, and the DBCS machines 
which have been decontaminated including those nearby DBCS machine #17.  We 
propose to divide the locations to be sampled into equal surfaces areas to be sampled.  
For example, if a ventilation diffuser above one of the mail sorting machines was to be 
sampled, then the surface of the diffuser would be divided into three equal parts and each 
part of the surface would be sampled using one of the three sampling techniques 
following the CDC Interim Procedures for Collecting Environmental Samples for 
Culturing B. anthracis (Arduino, M).   
 
The swab samples would be collected by removing a sterile, non-cotton swab from the 
package and moistening it with 100-200 µL (1-2 drops) of sterile water.  The selected 
surface will be swabbed by moving the swab back and forth across the surface with a 
series of horizontal strokes followed by a series of vertical strokes.  Care will be taken to 
ensure that the entire circumference of the swab is used.  The swab will be placed into a 
sterile conical vial, capped, prepared for shipment. 
 
The wipe samples will be collected by donning sterile, non-powdered gloves over the two 
pairs of nitrile gloves that are part of standard personal protective equipment.  The 
selected surface will be wiped with a 3" X 3" sterile cotton gauze pad moistened with 
about 5 mL of Baxter Sterile Water for Irrigation, USP7.  The surface will be thoroughly 
wiped by making 3 to 4 verticalS-strokes, folding the exposed side of the pad and 
making3 to 4 horizontal strokes over the same area.  The pad will be placed into a 
labeled, sterile conical tube and sealed with a cap.    
 
Surface vacuum samples will be collected by inserting a cone-shaped filtering Asock@ 
(dust collection trap manufactured by Health Home Air) into the nozzle of a HEPA 
vacuum cleaner.  The plastic sleeve of the dust collection trap was folded over the outside 
of the nozzle and hand-held in place while the vacuum nozzle was moved slowly back 
and forth across the sampled surface.  The dust collection trap will be removed from the 
vacuum nozzle and placed into a labeled, sterile conical tube and sealed with a cap.  
Before inserting a clean sock into the vacuum nozzle and collecting a subsequent sample, 
the sample collector put on new pair of sterile gloves and wipe the inside of the vacuum 
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nozzle thoroughly with an alcohol wipe.  The use of alcohol wipes is intended to 
physically remove contamination from the nozzle surface, not to sterilize that surface. 
 
The samples would be sent to the appropriate laboratories for analysisBthe CDC/NCID 
laboratory in Atlanta, Georgia will analyze the swab and wipe samples.  The sock 
samples will be analyzed by a contract laboratory.  The sock contents will be weighed on 
a precision balance.  To a cup containing the sock and its contents, 20 to 30 mL of 0.3% 
tween 20 in phosphate buffer solution (PBS) will be added and placed on a shaker for 30 
minutes.  The contents of the cup will be allowed to settle for 5 minutes and then the 
supernatant was poured into a 50 mL Blue Falcon screw-top tube.  The tube will be 
centrifuged at 3000 to 4500 rpm, for 15 to 30 minutes respectively at 10o C, then poured 
down to one tenth of the starting volume.  The pellet in the bottom of the tube will be 
resuspended and 0.1 mL (two drops from a Pasteur pipette ) and 0.01 mL (using a 
calibrated loop) of the suspension will be plated to a trypticase soy agar (TSA) with 5% 
sheep blood plates and streaked for quantification.  The plates will be incubated at 35-37o 
C in ambient air and examined after 12 to 18 hours.  Suspicious colonies will be screened 
using Level A procedures for identification of B. anthracis.  The identification of 
suspicious colonies will be confirmed by direct fluorescent antibody staining (DFA) and 
gamma phage lysis.  The results of these samples will be reported as number of colony 
forming units per gram of material collected (CFU/gm).   
 
2. Comparison of culture analysis and PCR analysis.  The wipe samples will be analyzed by 
both culture method and PCR analysis.  Extractions will be collected from the each wipe 
sample.  The extractions will be analyzed on-site by analytical chemists employed by the 
IT Corporation using the Ruggedized Advanced Pathogen Identification Device (RAPID) 
B. Anthracis Lethal Factor Detection Kit for specific detection of B. anthracis Lethal 
Factor.  The analysts will remove the wipe sample from the bag while wearing protective 
clothing and sterile gloves.  They will place a sterile swab into the extract.  This swab 
will then insert into a tube containing the anthrax reagent and small glass beads.  The 
tube will be vortexed to break the spores and DNA will be extracted from the supernatant 
using a column that binds DNA.  The DNA is added to PCR reaction tubes and analyzed 
for B. anthracis lethal factor. 
 
The number of samples for each of the three sampling methods will be determined after 
consultation with statisticians, but is likely to be approximately 100-150 samples of each type.  
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Research Priority 2  
 
Title: Evaluation of Risk of Disease in Contaminated Environments 
 
Introduction 
Only very limited data exists correlating degree of exposure to B anthracis spores to risk 
of anthrax infection and disease in humans.  This data is needed to assist in making decisions 
about need for decontamination, effectiveness of decontamination, and reoccupation of 
previously contaminated environments.  We recognize that decontamination of a facility to a 
Azero-spore@ level may not be a realistic objective. We propose using sero-conversion as a 
marker of subclinical anthrax infection as a health effect of interest in this study since the 
prevalence of clinical disease from contaminated environments has been low.  We also propose 
that sero-conversion must be evaluated a period of months after exposure, since even clinical 
disease can take up to two months to develop after exposure and antibody responses take 




There is a relationship between level of exposure to an anthrax-contaminated 
environment and risk for asymptomatic infection and clinical disease.  Furthermore, that 




To establish a Atarget level@ of contamination to which sampling techniques would be 
oriented in order to declare a site below the level of B. anthracis spore contamination which 




1) All existing data documenting levels of environmental contamination with anthrax 
collected over the last several months will be gathered into a single data base.  Data will 
be assessed for quality (use of final rather than preliminary results) prior to entry.  
2) In addition to currently-available environmental assessments, follow-up assessment will 
be performed post-decontamination and at intervals after re-occupation corresponding to 
the period of assessment for sero-conversion. 
3) A panel of experts (primarily industrial hygiene specialists with statistical experts 
supporting the effort will assess data from various sites and categorize sites/areas as 
contaminated or not.  In addition, an effort will be made to semi-quantitate degree of 
contamination.  If the expert panel determines that insufficient environmental evaluation 
was performed to assess level of exposure in potential study subjects, additional 
environmental assessment will be performed in these subjects= work areas. 
4) A registry of potentially exposed individuals who occupied these areas will be 
established.  Exposed individuals will undergo evaluation by questionnaire to determine 
their personal and demographic characteristics, medical characteristics, occupational 
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characteristics, post-exposure prophylaxis, immunization status, etc).  Individuals will 
also have blood drawn between 3 and 4 months after exposure to assess serologic 
responses to a panel of anthrax-related antigens. 
5) Data evaluation will assess the prevalence of disease and sero-conversion as the health 
outcomes; measures of exposure (environmental assessments) will be evaluated as the 
primary risk factor for the health outcomes.  A univariate analysis will be done to 
evaluate exposure and exposure related variables (such as work site or job), PEP, etc. as 
risk factors for the health outcomes of interest.  A multivariate analysis will be 
performed to assess for confounding and effect modifiers. 
 
A secondary objective of this study could be to assess of degree of background B. anthracis 
spore contamination that exists in the environment both in endemic and non-endemic 
epizoonotic areas where no human disease has occurred.  This could be correlated to serological 
testing of banked blood in these regions. The hypothesis to be tested by this aspect of the study 
would be that low-grade environmental contamination of spores exists in places where anthrax 
is enzootic without causing human disease. 
 
Who will do project  
CDC/ATSDR, EPA, State and Local Health Departments, Postal Service, OSHA, etc. 
 
When to start project 
As soon as possible, while decontamination and post-exposure prophylaxis efforts are still 
active at many sites. 
 
Action Steps 
Connecticut -do air and surface sampling Thursday and Friday 
low levels of contamination-pool data with other postal facilities 
decide on sampling techniques-pool samples and pick method 
assign statistical team to look at data 
 
Quality Assurance to be done on existing data lab confirmed only (not rapid detector data to be 
used)  




Research Priority 3 
 
Title: Determination of Risk of Reaerosolization 
 
Introduction 
One of the observations that has emerged from the current anthrax outbreak is that spores of 
B. anthracis have a greater ability to reaerosolize after primary release than was thought possible.  
While it may be primarily a function of the processing method used to manufacture the powder 
used in at least two of the releases, it is clear that in DC there reaerosolization occurring both at 
the point of release (Hart Building) and the points of contamination (with operation of mail 
sorter #17 at the Brentwood facility).  In light of this experience, there is a need to resolve the 
conflict between past data downplaying reaerosolization potential and recent data which clearly 
demonstrates secondary reaerosolization.  This is necessary not only from the perspective of 
ability to declare a building safe after decontamination but also to be able to estimate the health 
hazard that is posed by fomites secondarily carrying spores such as cross-contaminated mail.  
Analysis of the reaerosolization characteristics of a spore-containing powder may also allow us 
to characterize the properties of the original spore release even though the vehicle may not have 
been recovered.   
 
Objectives 
To establish a body of knowledge about the reaerosolization potential of B. anthracis by 
comparing different agent preparations (wet, dry, w/additives, etc.) and compare energizing 
methods 
To be able to estimate risk posed to people in facilities after decontamination from a 
particular powder exposure and through use of decontaminated equipment (e.g., mail sorters) 
 
What is the research? 
Controlled testing in which a number of different surfaces are exposed to a series of well-
characterized simulant formulations via the aerosol route, at which point specified energies are 
applied via practical means and the rates of aerosolization measured.  This will generate a matrix 
of reaerosolization properties of spores in many different situations which can be utilized in any 
future release of spores.  These properties include particle size and charge, as well as spatial and 
temporal characteristics of the plume created by energizing spore preparations. 
 
How would it be done? 
In a controlled aerosol chamber, a combination of surfaces (carpet, tile, paper, mail, etc.), 
simulant formulations (B. globigii, B. thuringiensis, variable vs homogenous/respirable spore 
size mixtures) and preparations (wet and dry powders, additives such as silica or benzonite, 
fluids, etc.), and means of applying energy (walking on, shuffling papers, fanned, etc.) would be 
specified.  A test matrix would be derived from the above, and the rates of aerosolization 
measured via air sampling and selected analytical methods (culture, PCR, immunoassay, etc.). 
Materials containing fomites resulting from cross-contamination will be tested to see if there 
is sufficient amount of material to create a secondary aerosolization.(opening a letter that is cross 
contaminated via a mail sorting machine)  
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It is possible that similar experiments could be carried out at field sites where 
contamination is already evident (especially the very heavy contamination of sites like 
the Hart Building) but this would have to be organized in the very near term as 
decontamination efforts will soon make this data difficult to obtain from these sites.  
These experiments would be particularly useful in the context of cross-contaminated mail 




Research Triangle Institute, University of Cincinnati, UNLV, University of Colorado 
Boulder, USArmy (CDBC), Battelle, USArmy (Edgewood) 
 
When should it be started? 
 
The fomite (cross-contamination) assessment can be immediately piggy backed to 
ongoing experiments at Edgewood where they are using mail containing BG and 
determining the aerosolization risk when the contaminated letters are sent through a mail 






























Working Group 4: Surveillance 
 





During the months of September through November, 2001, eleven cases of inhalational 
anthrax and 12 cases of cutaneous anthrax were seen in the United States in the wake of a 
deliberate introduction of the bacterium through the U.S. Postal System.   Initial cases 
were first reported from Florida and New York City; subsequent cases were later reported 
in Washington, DC, New Jersey, and Connecticut.   
 
In order to detect potential cases as early as possible, to provide continuous case-finding 
capacity, and to retrospectively identify additional cases that might have been missed, 
each site implemented some combination of active and passive surveillance for both 
inhalational and cutaneous disease.  Although specifics differed slightly between sites, 
the surveillance generally took the form of active emergency room and intensive care unit 
surveillance, and a passive reporting system of suspicious cases by local providers.  In 
addition, active surveillance was conducted among several groups who seemed to be at 
particularly high risk (postal workers, transit authority workers, media employees). 
 
In a retrospective assessment of the implemented surveillance systems, it was clear that 
several aspects of these systems had significant gaps, and there were several areas in 
which improvement could be made.  The purpose of the surveillance working group was 
to identify such gaps or problems with the current systems; to identify the key areas of 
surveillance in which further consideration and research is most needed; and to prioritize 
these research needs for the next 12 months. 
 
During discussions, the working group identified several key issues and topics that were 
displayed by the current surveillance systems; such issues included the importance of 
physician and provider education in the success of an anthrax surveillance system, and 
the need for a strong partnership with physicians and providers; the potential importance 
of animal and veterinary surveillance with regard to anthrax, and the problems associated 
with the merging of animal and human surveillance; the need for reliable, accurate and 
rapid diagnostic testing for anthrax; the potential utility of the media as a partner in 
bioterrorism-related surveillance; and the need for continued active surveillance among 
those groups seemingly at highest risk (postal workers). 
 
From these issues, the five key items for the near-term research agenda were identified.  
These included the need for continued surveillance of illness and absenteeism in U.S. 
Postal Workers;  the need for verterinary surveillance and the need to integrate it with 
human surveillance; the use of other, alternative sources for surveillance; the 
development of potential scenarios with respect to GI anthrax and complex release 
situations; and a comprehensive evaluation of the systems used with this outbreak, and 
with the World Trade Center incident. 
Research Priority 1 
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Title: Veterinary surveillance, and integration with human health information 
 
Why is the research being done? 
 Previous outbreaks have indicated that many animals may serve as sensitive 
sentinels for public health events, and my portend upcoming outbreaks of illness among 
human populations (ex. Crows in West Nile virus outbreaks; prarie dog die-offs in 
plague) 
 
What is the research? 
 
1. Development and evaluation of scenarios in which animals might 
serve as sentinels for the early detection of public health events 
2. The evaluation of the ability of the current animal health 
surveillance system to detect bioterrorism-related diseases, and the 
capacity of these systems to communicate these events to the 
human public health system 
3. To evaluate which particular species of animals may best serve as 
sentinels for bioterrorism-related disease, and to determine disease-
specific animals in question. 
How would it be done? 
A veterinary working group would develop and analyze various 
scenarios Barriers to communication, and exact communication needs 
between veterinary groups and the human public health system would 
be assessed. 
 
Who should do it? 
Members/representatives of the national public health system and various 
local and state public health systems would collaborate with 
members/representatives of various veterinary groups (AAVLD, USAHA, 
AVMA, F&WL) 
  
When should it be done? 
Immediately.  CDC should work to identify other potential stakeholders in 
this issue. 
 
Research Priority 2 
 
Title:  The use of other, alternative sources of data in the surveillance for 
bioterrorist-related events 
 
A. Why should the research be done? 
It is possible that systems already in place could augment or aid traditional 
surveillance systems for bioterrorism-related disease.  In addition, it is 




B. What is the research? 
1. Descriptive:  to address the timeliness, utility, sensitivity/specificity, 
usefulness, and portability of information available from alternative 
data sources, and to assess the ability for this information to be rapidly 
used. 
2. Demonstration:  To apply a scenario to each data source and 
demonstrate its ability to detect cases 
3. Development:  To develop standard queries that can be applied to data 
sets 
 
Essentially, three categories of data sources were envisioned: 
1. Hospital information systems, including: 
a. Hospital utilization data 
b. Infection control personnel 
c. Laboratory data 
d. HEDIS/Quality measures 
e. Intensive care unit (ICU) surveillance 
f. Emergency department (ED) surveillance 
2. Emergency services 
a. 911 data 
b. Emergency medical technician (EMT) data 
c. Poison control data 
d. Nurse call lines 
e. Urgent care outpatient centers 
3. Other non-reportable data 
a. Pharmacies/pharmaceutical services 
b. Veterinarian laboratory data 
c. Medical examiners/coroners 
d. Commercial laboratories 
e. Employee absenteeism from occupational data sets 
 
C. How would the research be done? 
1. Data sources for study would be identified, using a working group of 
subject matter experts 
2. External grants and cooperative agreements with bodies/agencies with 
interest in the matter would be used to help facilitate working groups 
D. Who would do the research? 
Data sources would be obtained from a variety of sources of interest, 
including but not limited to: 
a. Hospitals 
b. Academic medical centers 
c. Peer-review organizations 
d. Healthcare providers 
e. HMO’s  
f. Association of Schools of Public Health 
g. CDC 
h. State and local health departments 
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i. Foundations (Robert Wood Johnson, Carter Center, etc.) 
E. When should the research be done? 




Research Priority 3 
 
Title: Design and validation of surveillance systems to detect complex contamination 
or release scenarios 
 
 A.  Why is the research being done? 
  The present outbreak presented a multitude of challenges in terms of 
surveillance, diagnosis, treatment, and public health action in general.   There are several 
potential scenarios in which these problems could potentially be multiplied; such 
scenarios include contamination of a widely dispersed food source, leading to a large and 
disperse outbreak of gastrointestinal anthrax; exposure in a mobile population; and attack 
or contamination with multiple bioterrorism agents.  Thinking out these possible 
scenarios, and designing effective surveillance approaches beforehand, may lead to much 
greater preparedness in these events. 
 
 B. What is the research? 
  Exposure scenarios, including those mentioned above and others, would 
be created by the involved groups.  Systems for effective surveillance would be proposed 
to these outlined scenarios.  The systems would be validated by methodologies to be 
determined. 
 
 C.  How would it be done? 
  Methodologies would be determined by the working groups 
  
 D.  Who should do the research? 
  Federal, state, and local public health departments; academic institutions; 
and other professional organizations with particular bodies of expertise should be 
included. 
 







Research Priotiry 4 
 




 A.  Why should the research be done? 
  Since September 11, 2001, a number of surveillance activities have been 
conducted, but the exact utility of these systems has not been clear, and the potential role 
for future situations has not been assessed.  Similarly, event-specific surveillance 
activities have been conducted around the recent events and others (World Trade Center 
incident; conventions; sporting events); evaluation of these surveillance activities remains 
to be conducted. 
 
 B.  What is the research? 
  Application of the basic methodologies of surveillance system analysis 
(eg. Sensitivity, specificity, positive and negative predictive value, timeliness, 
acceptability, cost) to recent surveillance activities. 
 
 C.  How should the research be conducted? 
 
  1.  Surveillance for human anthrax in DC, NJ/PA/DE, NYC, CT, FL, 
Postal facilities 
a. The surveillance system analysis described above should be conducted 
b. How were cases/suspect cases identified?  How did this change over 
time during the investigations?  What are strategies for making the 
systems more specific and more manageable? 
c. What is the role of various other parties, including state and local 
health departments, health care providers, and others? 
d. How do we optimize the role of other important players including 
infection control personnel, provider networks, etc.   
e. Are the current systems sustainable, in terms of cost, manpower, and 
efficiency, and if not, how can they be made sustainable? 
f. What was the efficacy of the various efforts to relay information and 
communicate, including mass faxes, internet postings to solicit reports, 
mailings, etc. 
 
2.  Other event-specific surveillance activities, including “drop-
in” surveillance 
a. Formal surveillance system analysis should be conducted 
 
D. How should the research be conducted? 
 It should be coordinated internally or through contacts or cooperative 
agreements 
 
When should it be conducted? 
Should be commenced immediately, through coordination of the multiple 




Research Priority 5 
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Title: Surveillance of Illness and Absenteeism in U.S. Postal Workers 
 
A.  Why is the research being done:  Recent mailings of envelopes with Bacillus 
anthracis have resulted in environmental contamination of several USPS facilities and  
cases of inhalation and cutaneous anthrax among exposed workers.  To help protect 
workers from further exposure and disease a number of interventions have been put into 
place including adminsitraiton of PEP, when indicated, coupled with monitoring of 
adherence and development of any associated adverse events; recommendations for 
engineering, administrative, and housekeeping controls, and personal protective 
equipment; and environmental cleaning and remediation of facilities. Nonetheless, postal 
workers may be at increased risk for exposure to B. anthracis as a result of the initial 
contamination of the mail system that occurred in September and October or from new 
contamination events.  
 
B.  What is the research: Development, evaluation, and comparison of different 
systems of surveillance to detect unexplained absenteeism and illness among postal 
workers that may represent cases of inhalational and cutaneous anthrax. 
 
C.  How would it be done:  
 
1) Obtain relevant background information from USPS 
 
USPS has an ongoing system of absenteeism tracking among workers; in addition, USPS 
in response to the cases of anthrax in its work force developed a plan to augmented this 
routine system to be more pro-active (i.e., initiate calls to workers for unexplained 
absenteeism).  More information is needed about the mechanics of these systems and how 
they have performed to date (e.g., their sensitivity and completeness in capturing 
information about workers with “suspect anthrax”who were  reported to other entities, 
such as CDC’s State and Field Teams). 
 
Additional information is needed regarding provision of health care to postal workers 
(e.g., are there certain HMOs or other networks that postal workers preferentially enroll 
in; does this differ by geographic area, etc.) and existing occupational health services 
within USPS.      
 
2) Identify cohorts of workers for surveillance 
 
Workers theoretically at highest risk of exposure would be those who worked at the 
“index” processing and distribution centers (e.g., Hamilton, Brentwood, Morgan, 
Wallingford, West Palm Beach Main).  Lower risk cohorts would include those who 
worked at postal facilities (both with and without high speed sorting machines) 
“downstream” from the index facilities.  Workers at facilities that did not receive mail 
from index processing and distribution centers facilities (if such facilities can be 
identified ) or workers at facilities that have not been part of the outbreak investigations 
and have tested “negative” by environmental sampling by USPS  theoretically would be 
at lowest risk.   
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Workers in the highest exposure risk group should be included. Resources and other 
factors will determine ability to expand beyond this group.  
  
3) Design, implement, and evaluate different systems of surveillance 
 
a) Absenteeism evaluation 
 
Methods: Building on efforts that USPS has already developed, employees would be 
contacted after a pre-determined period (e.g., 48 hours) of unexplained absence from 
work to establish if the worker is ill.  If so, a systematic, brief query of worker (or proxy, 
if too ill) would be performed to establish if 1) respiratory or cutaneous illness present; 2) 
worker hospitalized, or 3) further follow-up required. 
 
b) Hospital-based surveillance 
 
Methods: Hospitals in the catchment areas where postal workers under surveillance might 
seek care would report on a pre-determined basis (e.g., daily vs 2-3x/week) any 
hospitalizations or Emergency Department visits by postal workers to health departments.  
Further follow-up would be initiated for “high-risk”respiratory or cutaneous illness. 
 
c) Provider surveillance 
 
Methods: If a sizeable fraction of postal workers in catchment areas under surveillance 
receive care from a circumscribed network of providers or HMOs, such providers or 
organizations would report on a pre-determined basis (daily vs 2-3x/week) any visits by 
postal workers to health departments.  Further follow-up would be initiated for “high-
risk” respiratory or cutaneous illness. 
  
d) Death certificate review 
 
Methods: Death certificates in states where  postal workers are under surveillance would 
be reviewed for any death in a person identified to be a postal worker. 
    
Analyses: The various surveillance approaches could be individually evaluated as well as 
compared regarding detection of “high-risk”  illnesses (not necessarily limited to anthrax) 
in high risk cohorts of workers.  Other research questions of potential interest could 
include estimation of the frequency of “high-risk” illnesses (would require denominator 
data) and if that varied by level of exposure in the cohorts (provided more than the 
highest risk cohort of workers was evaluated) and comparison of temporal trends in 
worker absenteeism for the 6-month/12 month (?)  period following October 4, 2001 with 
the previous year. 
 
D.  Where/who should do: Multiple partners including CDC (including NIOSH), 
USPS (both management and labor), health departments, hospitals, health departments. 
 
E.  When should it start: Very high priority that should be imitated immediately.  
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Working Group 5: Diagnosis 
 
Recommended Research Priorities 
 
Background 
                                                                      Potentail Exposure 
The working group used this diagram to  





Yes (exposed)     No 
 
  Is there a marker? 
 
                                  Infected         
          Yes (in macrophage)                                               No 
 





Yes     No 







Research Priority 1 
 
Title: Identifying the earliest detectable event in the continuum from exposure to 
anthrax  disease 
 
Goal: To identify a test which will assist the clinician in answering the following two 
questions:  
1. Does an asymptomatic potentially exposed individual require PEP? 
2. When can the asymptomatic individual on PEP discontinue their antibiotics? 
 
Objective: Use animal models to identify and prioritize potential early markers within the 
continuum of exposure to disease.   
A.  Technologies to investigate and prioritize [not exhaustive, currently existing 
or under development]: 
1. Pathogen-related technologies  
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a. Culture 
b. DNA [technology=diagnostic PCR by microarray] 
c. Toxins [technology= Time Released Fluorescence 
(TRF)] 
d. Spores [technology=TRF] 
2. Host-related technologies 
a. Gene transcription [technology=microarray; PCR] 
b. Host Cell Response [technology=Proteiomics; C-fiber 
stimulation] 
c. Immune Response  
i. Cytokine upregulation and downregulation 
ii. IgM, IgG [targets=PA, LF, EF, spore, 
capsule] 
B. Aspects of animal model to consider:  
1. Timing of specimen collection 
2. Manner of collection and preservation 
3. Specimen types  
4. Species 
5. Other groups’ ongoing research and possibility of serial sacrifices 
 
Who:    
- CDC 
- Battelle 
- University of GA 
- Emory University 
- NIH 
- USAMRIID 
- Harvard Medical School 
- Stanford 
- Pasteur Institute 
- Israel – Weisman Institute 
- England – Porton Down 
 
Where: Consider Plum Island (60,000 sq ft available) 
 










Research Priority 2 
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Title:  Rapid Diagnosis of Anthrax 
 
Goal: To make available a rapid test at the facility-level to assist the clinician who 
suspects anthrax (To address question 4 of introduction) 
 
Objectives:  
1. Perform inventory of diagnostic tests currently available in commercial institutes, 
academic institutions, government agencies.  
a. Complete a survey of rapid tests for all infectious agents to develop platform 
technologies.  This will involve coordinating a meeting to promote 
collaboration and pooling of resources. 
  b. Develop validation process for tests 
c.  Evaluate tests    
2. Determine how better to use and distribute diagnostic technologies currently 
available. 
3. Reevaluate currently available tests in setting of new technologies. 
4. Identify gaps in current diagnostic methods. 
 
Where: NIH/CDC to facilitate collaboration between multiple agencies 
 
When: First quarter 2002 [Planning of meeting to begin immediately involving 
identification of all appropriate companies, agencies, and departments for inclusion] 
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Research Priority 3 
 
Title: Developing a library of subtypes 
 
Goal: To enhance resolution of current subtyping techniques to prepare for future 
outbreaks of B. anthracis and other BT agents 
 
Objectives: 
1. To develop a representative and diverse sample collection with a curator (at CDC).  
Collection should include: 
a. Geographic diversity 
b. Temporal diversity 
c. Species diversity 
d. Source diversity 
2. To characterize these samples by all known subtyping methods 
3. To obtain collection of control organisms [organisms closely related to B. anthracis] 
4. To develop similar libraries of other BT agents 
 
Who:  
-     * CDC 
- * ATCC 
- Louisiana State University 
- Los Alamos 
- AFIP 









Working Group 6: Treatment 
 
Recommended Research Priorities 
 
Research Priority 1 
 
Title: Investigation of the role of immune and anti-toxin therapies – a framework. 
 
I. Passive Immunotherapies 
A. Antitoxin Therapies 
i. Immunoglobulin – Human – immune modulating effect? 
1. 10 U available for compassionate use 
2. human consent, double-blind study on serum from 450 
vaccinated individuals, dosage? 
3. Potential cost: $2 million for processing of sera from 1200 
donors 
4. Small scale treatment vs. stockpile 
ii. Immunoglobulin – Animal: decreased adverse effects with equine 
sera stripped of Fc 
1. different effectiveness of animal vs. human 
immunoglobulin ? 
2. difference in mortalities with use of equine antisera- data 
from Europe? 
3. protection in animals if given prophylactically 
iii. Polyclonal immune therapy – other components of product-LEF, 
opsionic 
1. test in parallel with Anti-PA 
2. how well do adjuncts work? 
3. measure antibody levels and compare with antigen levels in 
immunized 
iv. Monoclonal immune therapy – specifically directed against PA 
(trials ongoing), target single epitope, toxin in human does not 
differ substantially, developing monoclonal antibodies with 
increasing affinities- predicted product in 18 mos? 
v. Dominant Negative Mutants 
1. assess levels, pharmacokinetics, t1/2 of product in human 
system 
2. phase 1: assess efficacy in animal model 
3. phase 2: assess pharmacokinetics in human system 
4. can GNP be developed quickly? 
vi. Metalloprotease inhibitors (ACE I) 
vii. Activated Protein C 
viii. Amines 
 
B. Antibody response from survivours: Late response, earliest response seen 
at 10 days, cutaneous with greater delayed anti PA response 
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Research Prioroty 2 
 
Title: Expanded investigation of anitibiotic therapies in animal models. 
 
II. Antibiotic Therapies – 2 beta lactamases produced; “penicillinase” and 
“cephalosporinase”; when is each activated? 
A. Monotherapy: advantage of single agent for treatment is decreased toxicity 
1. Develop animal models to obtain additional data: 
clindamycin, tetracyclines, rifampin, amoxicillin (increased 
risk of mutational event) 
2. Obtain additional data: linezolide, carbepenems, ketolides 
(low MIC, unknown safety), lincomycin, macrolides, 
(azithromycin, clarithromycin MIC < 0.25 in 15 strains 
tested) 
3. clindamycin: more potent suppression based on antibiotic 
concentrations, actively transported 
1) excellent results with Clostridium perfringens 
and group A strep 
B. Synergisitic Therapy: difficult to show additive effects 
1. in vitro vs. in vivo 
2. animal model to evaluate toxin production with synergistic 
therapy 
3. aminoglycosides in combination with other antibiotics 
4. carbapenems; appear active with good penetrance 
5. ciprofloxacin and rifampin: increased tissue penetrance? 
6. rifampin exerts effect during stationary growth phase 
C. Combine antitoxins and antibiotics for treatment: early intervention 
proposed; study to evaluate with variable arms to compare treatments; 
antitoxin alone, antitox + abx, abx alone 
D. in previous 10 cases, no DIC, clinical course differed from acute bacterial 
sepsis 
E. disease caused by B. anthracis appears to be more toxin mediated 
F. develop cytokine profiles 
 
Research Priority 3 
 
Title: Developing Alternative Animal Models 
Other nonhuman primates (other than rhesus monkeys) 
Rabbits: rapid progression of disease, ?more susceptible to B. anthracis, not 
ideal for immunological studies, different cytokines and complements 
Guinnea pigs: do not reflect primate response for vaccine evaluations 
Evaluate pharmacokinetics, toxin levels, viable organisms in animal models 






Empiric Therapy: oral mass casualty versus individual treatment 
naturally occurring quinolone resistance?, low organism burden, gyrase 
related 
extracellular vs. intracellular manifestations; do spores vegetate in 
macrophages? 
1. toxin assay (biological activity) measure suppression, 
macrophage assay 
2. protein inhibitors appear effective 
Steroids: used in some of current inhalational and 1 cutaneous case 
3. anecdotal reports in literature, studies ongoing with steroids 
in septic shock 
4. studies planned with lethal toxin and edema toxin, in vitro 
studies examining cAMP 
5. in 10 clinical cases: hemorrhagic events with organisms 
obstructing blood vessels 
6. lymphatic obstruction in mediatinum with dilated 
lymphatic channels 
 
Long Term Therapy (2o Prophylaxis); likely intracellular activities 
antibiotic regimen does not affect spores, concern based on innoculum 
cutaneous disease – no recurrence known with zoonotic cutaneous ds. 
Reports of meningitis developing from cutaneous disease 
inhalational disease – induction of immune response due to bacteremia, 
spectrum of immune response varies 
 pathways: 1) stop tx, monitor clinically and serologically OR 2) 
administer antibiotic therapy for number of weeks, follow with vaccine 
outcome with cutaneous disease in setting of inhalational exposure: 
what is the immune response? 
who should be vaccinated? 
is there subclinical infection? 
is there degradation of spores? 
 
Limitation of Studies: 
Aability of animal models, availability of animals 
Facilities for creating inhalational exposures, but for therapy investigations, 
may not have to aerosolize as action may be primarily extracellular 
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Research Priority 1 
 
Ttle: Long Term Use of Antimicrobials for PEP: Monitoring of Adherence, Barriers 
to Adherence, and Adverse Events  
 
Why is the research being done?: 
 
Prepare a series of materials so adherence is monitored and promoted more effectively 
during potential future anthrax post exposure prophylaxis campaigns. 
  
Optimize compliance with recommendations for PEP   
 
 
What is the research?: 
 
Monitor level and process of adherence to PEP 
 
Identify individuals at risk for non-adherence 
 
 Identify barriers to adherence, including side effects that may affect adherence 
 
Clarify and specify the interventions that will improve adherence 
 
 - Clarify/educate/communicate regarding rationale for antibiotics 
- Explore the use of a hotline for persons on PEP with questions about their 
antibiotic use 
- Communicate for the buy-in of affected cohort – address potential 
cynicism/mistrust; develop method for delivering message to achieve buy-in (e.g. 
explanation of environmental data relevant to the individual and what it means as 
far as risk) 
 - Proactive management of side effects 
- Identification of environmental cues (e.g. calendars, beepers, pill bottle next to 
toothbrush) to decrease forgetting pills 
 
 
Evaluate the systems through which these assessments/interventions will be implemented 
  
Develop blueprint for identifying critical organizations/players/systems (e.g. 
occcupational health clinics; local/county/state health departments; management; 
unions; professional organizations)  
 
Monitor impact of adverse events on adherence 
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1. Post-60 day quantitative evaluations of adherence, barriers to adherence (e.g. could not 
get to refill, misperception of risk, etc.) at least 3 sites 
 
- representative sample from each area 
 - appropriate method (telephone survey, interview) to be determined 
 
2. Real time evaluation of adherence and barriers to adherence in Connecticut using 
MEMS caps and brief survey/questionnaire in a representative sample 
 
3. Employ MEMS caps and/or diaries for a subset of those getting vaccine in addition to 
antibiotics following the initial 60 day PEP campaign. 
 
 
Projects in the event of subsequent anthrax release: 
 
1. Development of introductory screening survey that collects demographic information 
(e.g. employment info, work schedule, contact information, living situation, gender, 
race/ethnicity). This survey would be administered on day 1 to anyone receiving 
antibiotics for PEP from the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile.  
 
Data would be used for the following purposes: 
 
- lay groundwork for later identification of predictors of non-adherence 
(inconsistent work schedule, living  alone, gender/race)    
 
- identify individuals at risk for non-adherence and direct interventions 
based on what is already known about risk factors for non-adherence 
 
- determine whether follow-up information draws from a representative 
sample of the cohort in question 
 
 
2. Develop a system such that a random sample of individuals getting antimicrobials for 
PEP from the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile receive bottles with MEMS caps. Study 








Where could it be done?: 
 
Post 60 day follow-up: Washington DC, New York, New Jersey, Florida  
 
Real time adherence data using MEMS caps: Connecticut 
 








collaborators: FDA, NIH, academic experts, CDC/NIP 
 
 
When should it be started (including action step with assigned responsibility)? 
 
60 day follow-up plans that are already underway should continue to be developed under 
the lead of an additional staff member assigned to the CDC’s adverse events and 
adherence working group.  
 
30 day follow-up plans in Connecticut (and consideration of the addition of MEMS caps 
to monitor adherence) should fall to an additional staff member assigned to the CDC’s 
adverse events and adherence working group. 
 
 
Research Priority 2 
 
Title:  Pediatric safety and immunogenicity study 
 
Why is the research being done?  No pediatric data. Need FDA indication for pediatrics. 
Children compose 20% of the US population, and maybe specifically targeted by 
terrorists particularly in locations such as schools and Day Care Centers.  Young infancts 
may be at higher risk for infection related to immature immune response, anatomic, 
physiologic, and behavioral differences. Prolonged antibiotic exposure may have more 
adverse consequences than observed in adults. A 60-day course of antibiotics alone may 
not be protective in this population sub-group. 
 
What is the research?  Phase I, Open-label, dose-escalation, immunogenicity, and safety 
in three age cohorts.   
 Age Cohorts 
  11-17 
  2-11 
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  <2 years 
 Ten males and 10 females in each group to identify possible gender differences. 
 Route: IM 
 Schedule: 0, 2 weeks, 4 weeks 
  Formulation:  1:10 dose, 1:5 dose; full dose 
 Bleed Schedule:  4 weeks, 8 weeks for essential end-points with six-week bleed to 
capture peak antibody level. 
 
How would it be done? The CDC Human Anthrax Vaccine Research Network and 
additional pediatric centers. Research results can be compared with adult studies 
currently underway. 
 
Where could it be done? See above. 
 
Who could do it? See above. 
 
When should it be started? This can begin as soon as IND and IRB approval are 
obtained. Sufficient vaccine stocks will be available. 
 
 
Research Priority 3 
 
Title:  Animal challenge study to optimize post-exposure prophylaxis in humans 
 
Why is this research being done:   
Recent bioterrorist dissemination of B. anthracis through the mail together with 
aerosolization models suggest that the level of exposure to B. anthracis in future events 
may be much greater than that for which PEP effectiveness information is available.  
Concerns that 1% retention of spores at 60 days may represent a dangerous level if initial 
exposures are very high lead to the need to evaluate alternative PEP regimens against a 
higher dose exposure. 
 
What is the research: 
This proposal involves a large animal challenge study which incorporates survival, 
estimate of spore retention/clearance (either via autopsy or if feasible, bronchoscopic 
biopsy evaluation), and in certain arms, serologic evaluation.  The principal objectives 
are to: 
a. Determine whether a high dose (400 LD 50’s? something comparable to Canadian 
aerosolization model and to Daschle letter content) challenge requires PEP to be 
continued for >60 days 
b. Determine whether vaccine administration early in PEP can shorten the duration 
of PEP needed for protection following a high dose exposure 
c. Evaluate the utility of alternate antibiotic agents which are preferred for 
populations with unmet needs (eg, pregnant women, children) or which may lead 
to greater adherence (eg, fewer side effects or less frequent dosing) or which 
would expand armamentarium in the event of engineered resistance to current 
drugs 
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d. Determine whether intermittent dosing of the standard agent can enhance 
effectiveness through initiating immune response to transient exposure to 
germinated organisms 
 
How would the research be done: (see table) 
 
Using acceptable animal model, deliver 200-400 LD50 anthrax aerosol challenge on Day 
0, institute the following post-exposure regimens on Day 1: 
 















Doxy for 30 days 
+ 3 doses AVA 
? V V,B V,B B B 
B 
B B, N 
Doxy for 30 days ?        N 
Doxy for 30 days ? N  
Doxy for 60 days ?     N  
Doxy for 60 days ?        N 
Doxy for 10 days, then 
Mon, Wed, Fri for total of 60 
days 
?   B  B B  N 
Doxy for 90 days ?        N 
Doxy for 120 days ? B B B B B B B B,N 
Doxy for 120 days ?       N  
Amoxi BID for 60 days ?   B  B B  N 
Long-acting macrolide SID 
for 60 days 
?   B  B B  N 
Controls (no PEP) ?  (Necropsy to count spores and to confirm death as anthrax) 
Legend: V = anthrax vaccine     B= bleed for serology (ELISA and TNA)   N=necropsy 
& spore count 
 
Who could do it:  This will be a multiagency collaboration with an integrated project 
team involved in planning and a scientific steering committee providing oversight.  
Partners with the ability to undertake this type of large-scale animal study with BSL3 
requirements include Battelle & USAMRID.  The public health questions at the 
centerpiece suggest a need for CDC involvement in the collaboration. 
 
When should it be started/action step w/ assigned responsibility: 
The lack of available macaques in addition to their price make the most urgent action step 
that of identifying a suitable alternate animal model.  Immediate steps to identify such a 
model will involve the convening of an “Integrated Project Team’ with subject matter 
experts and others to review available data regarding alternate animals (USAMRID 
proposed to organize this meeting by February 1 if possible).  The next step following the 
identification of a potentially suitable alternate model would be to conduct a small pilot 
study of infectious challenge, autopsy review, and serology assessment in the proposed 
animal.  In the meantime, protocol development for the full-scale study could go forward 
including biostatistical assessments of the sample size needed for each study arm for the 
highest priority research questions 
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 Working Group 8: Remediation 
 





Remediation strategies would depend on a number of factors including the level of 
contamination, the type of space being treated, and whether contamination was localized 
or disperse.  These strategies range from physical cleaning methods to physically remove 
contaminants from surfaces to the use of more potent chemical biocides.  The World 
Health Organization in their Guidelines for the Surveillance and Control of Anthrax in 
Human and Animals (3rd Edition;  http://www.who.int/emc-
documents/zoonoses/docs/whoemczdi986_nofigs.html) recommends the use of 
formaldehyde for disinfecting areas contaminated with Bacillus anthracis spores.  Other 
agents recommend by WHO include: glutaraldehyde, peracetic acid, and hydrogen 
peroxide.   
 
Formaldehyde has been used in the for decontamination of biological safety cabinets 
(BSCs), procedure rooms, and laboratories by CDC, USDA, DOD, in addition to textile 
mills (Young LS, Feeley JC, Brachman PS. Vaporized formaldehyde treatment of a 
textile mill contaminated with Bacillus anthracis. Arch Environ Health. 1970;20[3]:400-
403).  However, based on environmental protection and human/animal health hazards, 
alternatives to formaldehyde as the recommended general-purpose disinfectant have been 
sought.  We have no experience with the use of large-area decontamination of more 
complex spaces, i.e. postal sorting facilities and large office complexes, or outdoor spaces 
such as stadiums. 
 
Currently available sterilization methods for miscellaneous articles, critical items, and 
large spaces include the following:  
 
Artifacts, office articles and critical items:  depending on the nature of the items that need 
to be recovered, treatments may vary and may include the following options: ethylene 
oxide sterilization, vapor phase hydrogen peroxide, chambered formaldehyde; and 
autoclaved of heat stable items. 
 
Areas: Clean up will depend on the level of contamination and whether it is diffuse or 
point source.  The dispersion of spores from an aerosolization event would be 
characterized by sampling and indicated by wide spread contamination within a facility.  
Remediation options may range from surface cleaning to fumigation. 
 
a. Disperse contamination may be indicative of an aerosolization event. 
b. Point source contamination along the pathway of mail or foot traffic supports 
localized cross-contamination.  Point source contamination may lead to wide 




The simplest method to use is soap and water cleaning to physically remove spores from 
contaminated surfaces.  However, if germicidal activity is needed then sodium 
hypochlorite or chlorine dioxide solution can be used.  If sterilization is attempted  
formaldehyde, glutaraldehyde, hydrogen peroxide, peracetic (peroxyacetic) acid, 
peracetic acid and hydrogen peroxide mixture, amylphenol, amylphenol+phenylphenol 
can be used.  Each of theses substances has advantages and limitations, including 
potential carcinogenicity and other associated health risks. 
 
Other potential surface decontamination agents include Enviro-foam, nanoemulsion, 
EDT, GD-5, etc which require further evaluation. 
 
Sporicidal fumigants include:  Ethylene oxide, Formaldehyde, Ozone and Chlorine 
dioxide gas.  The weaknesses are that there have been no standardized studies relevant to 
the large-area decontamination of federal facilities, airports, subways, office buildings, 
sports arenas, etc.    
 
Many of these chemicals are toxic to humans.  Ethylene oxide and formaldehyde are 
probable human carcinogens.   Exposure to ethylene oxide (ETO) concentrations above 
2,000 ppm has resulted in headache, nausea, vomiting, dyspnea, hematological 
abnormalities, and respiratory irritation.    Exposure to formaldehyde (HCHO) 
concentrations of 10 to 20 ppm produces immediate eye irritation and a sharp burning 
sensation of the nose and throat which may be associated with sneezing, difficulty in 
taking a deep breath, and coughing; recovery is prompt from these transient effects. 
Prolonged formaldehyde exposure can also result in chronic allergenicity.   
 
The IDLHs for these chemical substance are as follows: chlorine dioxide 5 ppm, 
formaldehyde 20 ppm, and 800ppm for Ethylene oxide.  All fumigants require off 
gassing (aeration) and/or inactivation prior to allowing personnel to renter 
 
Irradiation by UV, X-rays, gamma rays and high-energy electrons may also be used for 




The group identified 12 high-need research areas and down selected these into three 
priority knowledge gaps: (1) evaluation of existing and innovative sporicidal remediation 
methods, (2) risk based decision logic for bioagent sampling and remediation, and (3) 
reaerosolization and transport studies.  The additional research needs that are would be of 
interest include: collection, treatment, QA of decontamination waste; sampling 
standardization; efficacy of control strategies for airborne infectious agents; building 
protection; re-occupancy and article release criteria; development of evacuation and 





Research Priority 1 
 
Title: Evaluation of Existing and Alternative Remediation Agents 
      
Rationale:  As a result of the recent events involving anthrax-laced letters sent through 
the mail, many buildings have been contaminated in the Eastern United States.  
Contaminated buildings include US Postal facilities, News media buildings/offices, and 
many government buildings in the District of Columbia.  Contamination in those 
buildings includes areas that were contaminated by cross-contaminated mail, foot traffic, 
or and aerosol dispersion from contaminated mail sorting equipment that processed that 
anthrax containing letters and in offices where anthrax containing letters were opened.   
 
Bacillus anthracis spores are the most difficult of the bioweapons to address in 
remediation processes.  Little is known about how to in actual fact remediate the most 
contaminated source sites and there are few choices that can be made based on existing 
products or technologies.  In order to make the best choices for selecting the appropriate 
agents to clean contaminated buildings well validated methods to assess currently 
available products or technologies and to assess new and innovative methods are needed.   
 
Nature of  Research:  The research should address areas which have an impact on site 
remediation and may include physical, mechanical, or chemical approaches.  In addition, 
there is also a need for real-time tools that can be used to assess the remediation process.  
Research focal areas should include 
 
 Analysis of physical and mechanical methods for reducing bioburden or load. 
 Controlled, comparative studies on the efficacy of existing liquid agents. 
 Model studies on gaseous and vapor space treatments. 
 Studies of emerging methods or approaches to decontamination and disinfection. 
 Tools for assessing remediation efficiency in real time real-time. 
 
Site of research: The working group proposes that studies be initiated under well-
controlled laboratory conditions.  Once laboratory studies have been completed then 
pilot-scale studies could begin followed by field-testing.  Portions of this research could 
be performed at EPA, CDC, DOD, Academia, National labs, and private industry 
partners.  The project would require a certain number of workgroup meetings, as well as 
teleconferences on an as-needed basis. 
 
Project leader(s): A joint CDC/EPA/DOD lead would be appropriate for the anthrax-
specific part of the project given the nature of the research to be accomplished.  Scientists 
from other agencies and organizations should be included.  An appropriate core group for 
the research could be a subset of the members of the remediation workgroup from the 
CDC December 10-11 research priorities meeting. This work could be done through 
interagency agreements, grants, and cooperative agreements. 
 




Research Priority 2 
 
Title: Risk-Based Decision Logic for Sampling and Remediation 
 
Rationale for project:  As a result of the recent bioattacks with Bacillus anthracis, a 
number of sites need to be remediated. Each of these sites may pose unique problems.  
Current guidelines for sampling are incomplete and have not been validated.  In addition, 
it is not clear that existing guidelines and protocols are being applied consistently.  
Further, comprehensive guidelines do not exist for the remediation of office, commercial, 
industrial and residential buildings or areas within such buildings.  In fact, previous 
cleanups of anthrax contamination have occurred only at military and laboratory sites. 
 
Nature of the research: The research will consist of two tasks related to sampling and 
remediation of anthrax-contaminated sites.  Task 1 will be the development of sampling 
strategies.  This effort will include identification and refinement of the appropriate 
techniques, when and where to apply them, characterization of the identified 
contamination, and determination of the efficacy of the remediation that will be 
performed.  Emphasis will be placed upon the development and implementation of 
statistically valid sampling methods.   
 
In Task 2 remediation strategies will be developed based upon the nature and extent of 
the identified contamination. It will provide a strategy for matching the remediation 
techniques with the characteristics of the contamination on a site- and space-specific 
basis.  The decision logic for remediation will take into account the following 
considerations: type of contamination, availability and efficacy of remediation methods, 
available resources, duration of remediation, post-remediation use of site, and stakeholder 
input. 
 
Performance of project: The first step will be the establishment of a multi-disciplinary, 
multi-organization group of experts who will assemble and review existing guidelines on 
sampling and remediation.  After considering all the data, the workgroup will prepare 
decision logic appropriate for the range of contamination scenarios.  The workgroup will 
also identify research needs to improve the decision logic over time.  Finally, the 
workgroup will examine methods to generalize/adapt the decision logic to other 
biological and chemical agents of terrorism for which remediation will be needed. 
 
Site of research: Any centrally located site.  The project would require a certain number 
of workgroup meetings, as well as teleconferences on an as-needed basis.  This work 
could be done through interagency agreements, grants, and cooperative agreements. 
 
Project leader(s): A joint CDC/EPA/USPS lead would be appropriate for the anthrax-
specific part of the project given the nature of the current bioattack.  Scientists from other 
agencies and organizations should be included.  An appropriate core group for the 
research could be a subset of the members of the remediation workgroup from the CDC 
December 10-11 research priorities meeting. 
 
Projected start date: As soon as possible 
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Reasearch Priority 3 
Title: Reaerosolization studies . . . Agent- and Space-specific scenarios 
 
Studies that define the parameters affecting the extent of reaerosolization of Bacillus 
anthracis endospores are needed as input to potential risk assessment studies for 
potentially exposed groups before before, during, and after remediation. 
 
Methods are needed to quantitatively assess the potential for B. anthracis endospores to 
be reaerosolized during human activity (normal work/usage as well as during 
remediation).  Relevant parameters that may affect reaerosolization during static and 
dynamic situations will be evaluated.  Parameters may include (but are not limited to) 
size distribution of weaponized B. anthracis, particle charge, spore surface characteristics, 
spore powder additive characteristics, contaminated surface characteristics (smooth, 
porous, fibrous, et al.), level of surface contamination, RH, air flow, and other 
parameters.  An appropriate simulant needs to be identified that meets the parameters 
identified above for use in applied studies.  Using this simulant, pilot- and field-scale 
studies will be performed to validate the laboratory findings as well as to validate (or at 
least provide input to programmers) various exposure and dispersion models.  Currently 
contaminated locations (AMI, selected POs, offices, mail investigation sites, etc.) may be 
ideal opportunities to initiate these studies; however, expansion to other 
scenarios/locations (train, metro, schools, shopping malls, existing federal test beds, etc ).   
 
This work could be done through interagency agreements, grants, and cooperative 
agreements. Investigators at Dugway Proving Grounds, Battelle Labs, Lovelace 
Respiratory Research Institute, Argonne National Lab, University of Cincinnati, 
University of Iowa, University of Minnesota, University of California Berkeley, 
University of Michigan, NIOSH, NCID, SWRI, Sandia National Laboratories, DOE, 
DOD, USPS, AFL-CIO, LSU, and others could conduct the studies. 
 









Bacillus anthracis Bioterrorism Research Priorities for Public Health Response  
 
Objective: To work with federal partners and other stakeholders to identify, 
prioritize, and coordinate near-term B. anthracis bioterrorism research for 
public health response. 
 
Monday, December 10, 2001 




08:30-08:35 Welcome Jim Hughes, Director, NCID, CDC 
 
08:35-08:45   Overview of Anthrax Bioterrorism Investigation 
   Julie Gerberding, Acting Deputy Director, NCID, CDC 
    
08:45-08:50 Administrative Issues 
   Richard Skibicki, DBMD/NCID/CDC 
    
08:50-09:00 Meeting Objective and Organization 
   Bradley A. Perkins, Chief, Meningitis & Special Pathogens 
Branch, DBMD/NCID/CDC 
    
Hazard Assessment 
 
09:00-09:20  Evaluation of B. anthracis containing powders or substances 
   Mathew Shaw, Battelle Memorial Institute  
     
09:20-09:40  Epidemiologic Investigation 
   Philip Brachman, Emory University 
     
09:40-10:00  Environmental Assessment 
   Edwin Kilbourne, ATSDR 
    
10:00-10:20  Surveillance 
   Ruth Berkelman, Emory University 




Diagnosis, Treatment, & Prevention of Anthrax 
 
10:40-11:00   Introduction 
   Art Friedlander, USAMRIID, DoD 
     
11:00-11:20   Diagnosis 
   Susan Alpert, C.R. Bard Inc. 
 
11:20-11:40   Treatment 
   Dennis Stevens, Veterans Affairs Medical Center and University 
of Washington 
 
11:40-12:00   Post-exposure prophylaxis 
   Diane Murphy, FDA 
 
12:00-12:20   Remediation 
   Dorothy Canter, EPA 
 
12:20-12:40  Break (pick up lunches) 
 
 
Working Group Session I (& working lunch) 
 
12:40-17:30   Working Group 1 (Red)  Room, Mary Gay D 
   Evaluation of B. anthracis containing powders or substances 
   Co-leaders: 
   Mike Miller, NCID/CDC (for David Wilson, FBI, who was not 
able to attend) 
    Richard Meyer, NCID/CDC 
    
   Working Group 2 (Dark Green)  Room, Mary Gay C 
   Epidemiologic Investigation 
   Co-leaders: 
    Martin Hugh Jones, Emory University 
    Beth Bell, NCID/CDC 
    
   Working Group 3 (Yellow)  Room, Oakhurst 
   Environmental Assessment 
   Co-leaders: 
    ?, EPA 
    Ken Martinez, NISOH/CDC 
    
   Working Group 4 (Blue)  Room, Swanton  
   Surveillance 
   Co-leaders: 
    Ruth Berkelman, Emory University 
    Tracee Treadwell, NCID/CDC 
    
   Working Group 5 (Black)  Room, Rutland 
   Diagnosis 
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   Co-leaders: 
    Susan Alpert, C.R. Bard 
    Janet Nicholson, NCID/DBMD 
    
   Working Group 6 (Orange)  Room, Henry Oliver E 
   Treatment 
   Co-leaders: 
    Dennis Stevens, University of Washington 
    David Stephens, CDC/Emory University 
    
   Working Group 7 (Lime Green)  Room, Suite TBA 
   Post-Exposure Prophylaxis 
   Co-leaders: 
    John Grabenstein, DoD 
    Anne Schuchat, NCID/CDC 
    
   Working Group 8 (Pink)  Room, Suite TBA 
   Remediation 
   Co-leaders: 
    Dorthy Canter, EPA 
    Matthew Arduino, NCID/CDC 
 
Tuesday, December 11 
Plenary Session II 
08:30-08:55   Working Group 1 Presentation 
   Evaluation of B. anthracis containing powders or substances 
    Arnold Kaufman, NCEH, CDC 
 
08:55-09:20   Working Group 2 Presentation 
   Epidemiologic Investigation 
    Don Milton, Harvard University 
 
09:20-09:45   Working Group 3 Presentation 
   Environmental Assessment 
    Ken Martinez, NISOH, CDC 
 
09:45-10:10   Working Group 4 Presentation 
   Surveillance 
    Ruth Berkelman, Emory University 
     
10:10-10:30  Break    
10:30-10:55  Working Group 5 Presentation 
   Diagnosis 
    Susan Alpert, C.R. Bard 
    
10:55-11:20  Working Group 6 Presentation 
   Treatment 
    David Stephens, NCID, CDC 
 
11:20-11:45  Working Group 7 Presentation 
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   Post-Exposure Prophylaxis 
    John Grabenstein, DoD 
     
11:45-12:10  Working Group 8 Presentation 
   Remediation 
    Matthew Arduino, NCID/CDC 
Working Group Session II 
12:30-15:00   Working Group 1 (Red)  Room, Mary Gay D 
   Evaluation of B. anthracis containing powders or substances 
    
   Working Group 2 (Dark Green)  Room, Mary Gay C 
   Epidemiologic Investigation 
    
   Working Group 3 (Yellow)  Room, Oakhurst 
   Environmental Assessment 
    
   Working Group 4 (Blue)  Room, Swanton 
   Surveillance 
    
   Working Group 5 (Black)  Room, Rutland 
   Diagnosis 
    
   Working Group 6 (Orange)  Room, Henry Oliver E 
   Treatment 
    
   Working Group 7 (Lime Green)  Room, Suite TBA 
   Post-Exposure Prophylaxis 
    
   Working Group 8 (Pink)  Room, Suite TBA 
   Remediation 
    








Meeting Guidance and Suggestions 
for Working Group Sessions I and II 
 
Objective: 
To work with federal partners and other stakeholders to identify, prioritize, and 
coordinate near-term Bacillus anthracis bioterrorism research for public health response.   
   
Problem: 
During the recent anthrax bioterrorism investigation CDC and its partners identified a 
number of areas where additional research may be useful in improving public health 
response.  The disciplines and specific expertise required to approach many of these areas 
are varied and exist within multiple federal government entities and elsewhere.   To 
address those research questions that are most critical to improving public health 
response to B. anthracis-related bioterrorism, CDC has convened this meeting to obtain 
input on critical research priorities and coordinate with federal partners and other 
stakeholders in planning and conduct of applied research that needs to be initiated 
within the next 12 months. 
 
Meeting Design: 
There will be 2 plenary sessions (AM of December 10 and 11) and 2 working group 
sessions (PM of December 10 and 11).   
 
Monday, December 10, 2001 
Plenary session I will serve as an orientation to each of the topics areas for all meeting 
participants, and provide some opportunity for discussion and comments on the general 
topic areas.  After this, in the afternoon, participants will be divided intoeight working 
groups for Working Group Session I.   The eight working groups include: 1) Evaluation 
of B. anthracis containing powders or substances; 2) Epidemiologic investigation; 3) 
Environmental assessment; 4) Surveillance; 5) Diagnosis; 6) Treatment; 7) Post-exposure 
prophylaxis; 8) Remediation.  Each of the working groups has pre-assigned co-leaders, 
one from outside of CDC and one from CDC.  The co-leaders from outside of CDC are 
subject matter experts in the area of assignment.  Each of the CDC co-leads are senior 
scientists who have been heavily involved in the anthrax bioterrorism investigation and 
response.  In addition to the co-leaders, there is an assigned EISO or other epidemiologist 
to capture ideas on flip charts, and a recorder to capture ideas in a laptop for each of the 
working groups.  We have provided a list of questions for each of the working groups to 
help stimulate discussion and provide some direction based on observations during the 
investigation. 
 
Tuesday, December 11, 2001 
Plenary session II will provide each of the working groups an opportunity to present the 
results of previous days’ deliberations to all meeting participants, and obtain input from 
meeting participants in other working groups.  After this morning session, participants 
will return to their working groups for Working Group Session II to incorporate input 





Working group written reports will be edited, collated, and distributed to all meeting 
participants during the week of December 17.   
For each of the identified research priorities, at least clear action step with assigned 
responsibility will be included in the written report.   
A summary of the meeting and resulting research priorities will be prepared for 
publication in Emerging Infectious Diseases.  
 
Working group process: 
 - Review the list of working group-specific questions for clarification, 
modification, additions or deletions 
 - For each of the questions, answer the following: 
Can this question be addressed using existing published or 
unpublished, classified or unclassified data? 
  Is additional research needed to address this question? 
  Can additional research be done to address this question? 
  If yes, what research is needed? 
- Brainstorm each question recording responses and discussion on flip charts and 
typing into a laptop 
 - Review and combine or split as needed, and then prioritize brainstorming ideas 
- Select a working group member to present the results of the working group 
meeting in Plenary Session II the next morning 
- Use the brainstorming results and Plenary Session II presentation feedback to 
prepare a final written report using the following format for each of the three top 
priority research projects identified (max of 2 pages/project): 
  Title of the research project: 
  Why is the research being done? 
  What is the research? 
  How would it be done? 
  Where could it be done? 
  Who could do it (i.e., which institutions should collaborate)? 




 - Presentation of working group discussions in Plenary Session II 
 - Typed brainstorming list  
 - Typed report to including input from Plenary Session II  
- Minimum of one action step with assigned responsibility for each near-term 
research priority identified by the working groups 
 - Meeting summary to all participants during week of December 17, 2001 






 - Start and stop on time 
 - Only one person speaking at a time 
 - No side conversations 
 - Encourage each other to participate 
 - Treat each other with respect 
 - Stay focused on the task 
 
Role of subject matter expert co-leader for working groups: 
 - Focuses on task, not process 
 - Be sure everyone understands the problem/issue 
 - Communicate clear purpose and desired outcomes 
 
Role of facilitator co-leader for working groups: 
 - Responsible for keeping the meeting focused and moving 
 - Focuses on process, not task 
 - Directs team energy toward common task 
 - Suggests alternative methods and procedures 
 - Protects individuals and their ideas from attack 
 - Encourages participation from all team members 
 - Manages the meeting time 
 - Manages the brainstorming session 
 - Be aware of and deal with non-verbal communications 
 - Enforce the ground rules 
 
Role of the pre-assigned Flip Chart manager (EISO or other epidemiologist): 
- Record the brainstorming session on flip charts and assist in preparation of 
presentation for Plenary Session II and writing final report 
 
Role of the pre-assigned note taker: 
 - Type the brainstorming comments into the laptop and assist in preparation of 




Questions for Working Groups 
1. Evaluation of B. anthracis-containing powders or substances 
• Which rapid analyses of B. anthracis containing powders or substances can be 
used to help characterize the anthrax disease risk?  
• What samples can be utilized to describe the characteristics of suspicious powders 
or substances?  (i.e. swabs, washes, or powder only) 
• How do these characteristics relate to the risk of re-aerosolization? 
• How do these characteristics relate to the expected disease risk in a given setting? 
• What is the role and importance of microbiology & taxonomy studies in 
identifying all bacterial species in powders or substances? 
• When is a powder or substance completely characterized? 
• In addition to the physical and chemical characteristics of the suspicious 
substance or powder, what additional information is needed to define disease risk 
of disease in a given scenario (envelope, building, subway, outdoor event)? 
• How do simulates currently used in modeling of aerosol distribution compare to 
known B. anthracis containing products?  
• Do powder characteristics influence anthrax pathogenesis ? 
• How do particle size or components involved in preparation of the powder 
influence development of cutaneous anthrax? 
2. Epidemiologic Investigation 
• What is the infectious dose for inhalational anthrax in humans and how does it 
vary in response to host factors including age, underlying disease, medications? 
• What is the relationship between B. anthracis-containing particle size and risk for 
inhalational anthrax in humans?  
• What risk does re-aersolization of B. anthracis containing particles pose for 
inhalational anthrax?  
• Is the incubation period for inhalational anthrax in humans influenced by dose or 
host factors?  
• What is the infectious dose for cutaneous anthrax in humans and how does it vary 
in response to host factors including age, underlying disease, medications? 
• What is the relationship between occurrence of cutaneous anthrax and risk for 
inhalational disease?  
• What are the factors that would influence development of sepsis as a result of 
cutaneous anthrax (e.g., immunosuppression, age)  
• What additional studies needed of other potential release scenarios?  Which 
scenarios? 
• What is the impact of multiple exposures to small numbers of spores over several 
weeks? 
3. Environmental Assessment 
• Can environmental testing after an exposure for B. anthracis be used to assess 
human disease risk for inhalational and cutaneous anthrax?  
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• What is the role of air sampling? 
• What is the role ofsurface sampling? 
• What methods of environmental testing can be used to assess the disease risk for 
inhalational and cutaneous anthrax? 
• How reliable and important are quantitative or semi-quantitative methods for 
assessment of level of contamination?  
• How does particle size distribution of the source impact on environmental testing?  
• What, if anything, can be learned about particle size distribution of the source 
powder from air or surface sampling of the exposed environment?  
• Is there a level of background B. anthracis spore contamination in occupational 
settings and homes that pose a negligible risk to human health?  
• Should we determine background rates of naturally occurring anthrax spores?   
• What is the potential utility of real-time environmental-biodectors for detection of 
B. anthracis-containing particles in high risk locations?  
• Are there any potential alternatives to culture-based methods for rapid assessment 
of environmental testing for B. anthracis?  
• Are specific environmental characteristics of mail processing associated with a 
high risk for inhalational anthrax?  
4. Surveillance 
• What are the most effective surveillance strategies to detect inhalational anthrax? 
• What are the most effective surveillance strategies to detect cutaneous anthrax?  
• What is the role of emergency room surveillance?  
• What is the role of laboratory surveillance?  
• How should surveillance methodologies change once an initial case or event is 
identified?  
• How long after an initial case or event should active surveillance be maintained?  
• Once this “outbreak” is over, what are the priorities for surveillance?   
• How should surveillance be evaluated to identify weaknesses? 
5. Diagnosis  
• What are the diagnostic strategies for detection of anthrax in clinically ill 
patients? 
• Laboratory tests? 
• Clinical algorithsm? 
• Should strategies change for patients already on antibiotics?  
• Which laboratory diagnostic strategies might also have application for detection 
of B. anthracis in the environment? 
• What are the diagnostic strategies to identify persons who are exposed but not 
clinically ill? 
• What are the critical questions for use of serology in diagnosis and identification 
of exposed individuals? 
• Role of currently available serological assays?  
• Role of other serologic tests (e.g. toxin neutralization, antibody to lethal 
factor, anti-spore serology)?  
 54
• What is the role of molecular subtyping of B. anthracis?  How well are current 
methodologies performing?  Are additional subtyping methods needed? 
6. Treatment  
• What is the role of IgG, antitoxin, steroids, antitoxin antimicrobials (e.g. 
clindamycin) in the management of inhalational or systemic anthrax?  
• What is the significance of inducible beta-lactamases and the cephalosporinase in 
treatment regimens?  
• Are there clear synergistic antimicrobial combinations for the treatment of 
inhalational anthrax?  
• What is the role of intercellular antibiotic concentrations in the treatment of 
inhalational anthrax ?  
• Do ACE inhibitors, calcium channel blockers or other drugs have a beneficial or 
detrimental role in the treatment of anthrax?  
• At what point in evaluation of patients should treatment be initiated? 
7. Post-exposure prophylaxis 
• For antibiotic therapy, is a 60day regimen necessary? 
• What if antibiotics are initiated late (i.e., 30 days after exposure)?  
• For antibiotic therapy, is a 60day regimen sufficient?  
• What is the efficacy of various antibiotics for prophylaxis? 
• Is amoxacillin efficacious (drug of choice for pediatrics)?  
• Is levoquin efficacious?  
• Are there other effective prophylaxis agents, such as macrolides, ketolides, 
and other fluroquinolones?  
• Can synergistic combinations of agents be used to shorten prophylaxis?  
• What are the most effective mechanisms/interventions to promote and monitor 
adherence to prophylaxis?  
• How should adverse events associated with antibiotics be monitored?  Should all 
adverse events be monitored or only severe adverse events?  
• What is the efficacy prophylaxis for prevention of cutaneous anthrax?  
• What is the impact of prolonged prophylaxis on the development of antimicrobial 
resistance?  
• What is the time course of antibiotics that should be used when the person has 
already been vaccination (pre-exposure vaccination )   
• Are there specific indications for vaccination as a part of post-exposure 
prophylaxis or treatment? 
• What is the time course of antibiotics when vaccine is given as part of post-
exposure prophylaxis?   




• What are effective compounds for decontaminating various surfaces and 
environments?  
• What are the parameters that influence the choice of decontamination methods? 
• What is an acceptable level of B. anthracis spores post decontamination?  
• What are the parameters and indices to for effectiveness of decontamination?  
• What are the long-term health effects of various decontamination methods on the 
different populations potentially exposed (decontamination workers, users of 
decontaminated space, public)?  
• What are the most effective methods for decontamination of large buildings or 
individual floors in large buildings? 
• What is the risk of exposure to B. anthracis for decontamination workers and how 
should we moderate that risk? 
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